No mining. No proof-of-work. No seed phrase. A hardware card that never lets its key leave, and a chain underneath it that we designed from the ground up because nothing on the market did what we needed. This is that story, and the technical spec behind it.
cryptovault started as a hardware card. A simple promise: your private key is born inside a secure chip and never leaves it, so there is nothing on a server to steal and nothing to phish. That part worked, and it still does — not one customer has ever lost funds to an attack.
But the more we shipped, the more one question kept coming back: the card protects the key, but what protects everything around the key — the identity you log in with, the network you settle on, the message that has to reach you without ever sitting on someone else's server? Every answer we found on the market solved one of those problems by quietly re-creating the other. A wallet app that removes the seed phrase but keeps the secret in a phone. A "secure" login that is really just a password with extra steps. A blockchain that calls itself green while burning as much power as a small country to agree on a number.
That's the honest origin of Synapstream. It wasn't a roadmap slide first. It was months of taking the card's own rule — the key never leaves — and asking how far that rule could be pushed: into how you prove who you are on a website, into how a message reaches someone without a live connection, into how a ledger reaches agreement without anyone burning electricity to "win" the right to write to it. A patent application was filed on 2026-08-14 covering the core of that consensus mechanism. Four of its claims are already running in live code today, not just on paper.
Three parts that lean on each other:
The signature is born inside the secure element and never leaves it. No seed phrase exists to write down or steal. No battery, no outbound radio, no operating system to exploit.
Messages move without a permanent connection: rotating keys, no VPN, no open sessions sitting around waiting to be hijacked. A message can be anchored on a public chain as tamper-proof timestamped evidence — without the content itself ever being exposed.
Our own consensus, with no Proof-of-Work. Threshold approval with time-based key rotation instead of a computation race. The energy cost per confirmation lands in the same range as a normal server request — and that's something a third party will be able to measure, not just something we say.
A Web-ID is a key pair (ECDSA P-256) generated on your own device. The private half is encrypted locally and can't be used without both your code and the physical card. Every signature is bound to the exact domain that requested it, which makes phishing pages useless against it — a signature issued for the wrong domain simply doesn't verify. No national ID number, no ID document, no central identity database anywhere in the picture.
SYNA is Synapstream's native asset. The supply rules live in the protocol itself — not in a policy document we could quietly change later.
| Rule | Value |
|---|---|
| Vesting | 6-month cliff, then 42 equal monthly tranches of 475,000 SYNA, to a public, named address anyone can audit |
| Missed tranche | Pushed to the back of the queue — never merged into the next one |
We don't control the secondary market and we're not going to pretend we do.
Live and running: the card-based signing, Web-ID identity, and the Röd Tråd signal layer. Synapstream's chain itself is on testnet / standalone infrastructure while the consensus mechanism goes through external review ahead of genesis. When SYNA is ever mirrored on a public chain for liquidity, the mirrored amount will never be allowed to exceed what's actually locked on the Synapstream side — and that lock will be publicly verifiable, not just promised.
Both are published in full — the Swedish originals, unedited: